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In an age of austerity requiring hard fiscal decisions, the current geopolitical framework supports the new U.S. defense focus on Asia and the Middle East while rebalancing forces in a safer more secure Europe. The rebalance of forces in Europe still provides a strong commitment to NATO through reversibility, a better response to current security needs emanating from European challenges and threats, and committing a Brigade Combat Team to the NATO Response Force. While this promotes partnership building and interoperability, it focuses almost solely at the tactical level of brigade and below. In order to improve partnership building and interoperability, the United States should conduct command post exercises with our European Allies at the division and corps level, allow Allies to provide units and staff to our regional aligned brigades, increase personnel exchange programs, offer key developmental billets from brigadier general to major in European based U.S. commands and units, and collaborate with our European Allies on security cooperation activities.
THE DRAWDOWN IN EUROPE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
The stationing of U.S. forces has been a legacy in Europe for over 65 years.
Initially, U.S. forces remained in Europe at the end of the World War II in order to occupy areas of the former Axis Powers. In short order, they became a central component of the Cold War strategy of Containment. At the peak of the Cold War, there were over 375,000 uniformed members of the Armed Forces in Europe.
1 However, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has gone through two major draw downs in Europe.
The first, starting in 1992, brought U.S. forces down to 100,000 service members. The second, starting in 2004, brought the number down to 79,000. Now the Obama
Administration is proposing a third drawdown that will remove half of the U.S. combat brigades in Europe and bring down troop strength to 68,000 in Europe.
The driving factor of this third draw down is an unprecedented economic challenge to America. 2 The U.S. economy, which is a central element of its securitypaying for its forces and providing resources to underpin its tools of engagement and power throughout the world, is facing a fiscal crisis, which is threatening the economic wellbeing of the country. 3 According to government projections, should spending continue at the current rate, the debt to GDP ratio will reach 100% as early as 2022 and continue upwards to an unsustainable rate of 200% around 2035. 4 Political leaders of both parties recognized the importance that the military play a role in battling the annual budget debt. This political consensus resulted in legislation requiring a cut to military spending of 487 billion dollars over the next ten years, which also has been supported by the current and past Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 5 
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For most of the last quarter of 2011, the Department of Defense worked on a new strategy that it believes will meet the United States" needs while still realizing this significant savings from the military budget. 6 On January 5, 2012, the Department of Defense rolled out a new defense strategy entitled, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for a 21 st Century Defense," which he referred to as guidance and in this paper will be called the "Defense Guidance" and on February 3, 2012, it released "The Defense Budget Priorities and Choices," which will be referred to as the Budget Priorities in this paper. These documents provide a set of global priorities for the U.S. Armed Forces, which provide the framework for DoD"s defense strategy in the world, and they call for a pivot to Asia, greater emphasis in the Middle East, and a drawdown in Europe. A few days later, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta provided outline of this drawdown, which includes the removal of two heavy Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and two Air Force Squadrons. 7 Many bemoan this action fearing a pivot to Asia that neglects Europe is a strategic error, which endangers NATO Article V commitments, and they have good reasons to fear such an impact. 8 This paper will examine these questions and argues that in an age of austerity with a requirement to make hard decisions based on limited resources, the current geopolitical framework supports the new priorities, of which a need to "rebalance" forces (i.e., a drawdown) in Europe. This paper will show that while the Administration is conducting a pivot to Asia, this pivot should not be seen as a 180 degree turn away from
Europe. On the contrary, the administration is maintaining a strong commitment to Europe and NATO. The first section of this paper will outline the global priorities and the specifics of the drawdown of forces in Europe. Section two will conduct a geopolitical analysis of power in the world to see if the new Defense Guidance"s global priorities -"to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions," while adjusting "the posture to the land forces in Europe" -are an appropriate framework for the U.S. military. 9 The final section will analyze the objectives of maintaining a commitment to NATO"s Article V and promoting interoperability in Europe as the U.S. draws down forces, both of which are the central goals of a rebalance in Europe. It will also provide some policy suggestions to further our ability to meet these objectives.
Section One: An Outline of the Drawdown in Europe
With the release of the new Defense Guidance and the Defense Budget Priorities, a number of major changes were announced concerning DoD global priorities and U.S. 11 There also will be some, as of yet unspecified, increases to our European based special forces. These changes will entail a reduction of 10,000 service members from Europe leaving 68,000 service members when completed. In total numbers, this is actually a small decrease when compared to the drawdown of land forces after the Cold War. 12 When viewed as a percentage of remaining Land Forces combat power, it is substantial -almost a 50%
reduction. The objectives of the drawdown are to "rebalance our investments in Europe" through changes to our force posture while still being able to "maintain our Furthermore, the United States is still heavily involved in the stabilization of Iraq even though it has removed its combat forces from this country. Anyone of these pose threats to important U.S. interests, but the combination of all of them occurring now in this region, arguably makes it the most insecure area of the world in the short-to mid-term.
There should be no doubt that the United States needs to maintain a firm focus on this area given the importance this region plays in the world economy because of its vast production of oil and gas. However, due to the importance of NATO to the United States for the reasons outlined in the introduction of this paper, this pivot cannot be a 180 degree pivot that forebodes a decrease in the transatlantic ties that have developed over the last 60 years.
Care must be taken to ensure that U.S. commitments to NATO are maintained. In fact, this care to that commitment has been the centerpiece of U.S. policy since the inception of NATO, and the Obama Administration in its National Security Strategy and in the Defense Guidance has maintained this stance. However, does the new drawdown in
Europe support this U.S. goal?
Section Three -Analysis of new Drawdown in Europe
Our first step in analyzing the policy decision from the new Defense Guidance concerning Europe is to determine if the goals are attainable. The goals of the policy in Europe are two pronged. First, it is to "rebalance our investments in Europe" through changes to our force posture, and second, complete this rebalance while still being able:
-to "maintain our Article 5 commitments to allied security";
-to "promote enhanced capacity and interoperability for coalition operations."
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The 'Rebalance'
By the very nature of the cuts in forces stationed in Europe, it is apparent that the "rebalance of our investments" are being achieved. This force is being cut by 14% in manpower terms and is losing 50% of its land combat power. However, there will only be a limited cut in air forces amounting to just one A-10 Squadron and a small supporting squadron in Italy. While the cuts in question involve both land and air forces, due to the minor cuts to the forces in USAFE and the minimal controversy that these cuts have raised, the rest of the analysis will primarily address the cuts to the land forces from recovering from its mission and preparing for the next mission it will be assigned.
Multiplying 1/3 mission ready time by the four stationed brigades in Europe means that the U.S. will average 1.33 BCTs in a mission ready state over the course of a three year period.
Under the new proposal, we will have 2 European stationed BCTs, which, when multiplied by 1/3 mission ready time, results in 0.667 in a mission ready state average.
Adding the NRF committed BCT that is stationed in the U.S. means that the United
States increases the number of mission ready BCTs for NATO to an average of 1.667
over a three year ARFORGEN cycle. 42 We should also look at the reality of mission ready brigades in Europe over the last six years. In this period, we have seldom had combat ready brigades in Europe at all. The truth of the matter is that we have had on average about two brigades in Europe but they were not in a mission ready state. Instead, they were preparing to deploy to either Iraq or Afghanistan. The other two brigades, which were in a mission ready state, were actually conducting real world combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The United States is not only providing land forces support to NATO. It has also maintained its earlier commitment to provide a ballistic missile defense system that will forward station two Aegis destroyers in Spain, deploy a radar system in Turkey, and station SM-3 missile systems in Romania and Poland. These systems respond to a specific missile threat from Iran, provide an important new U.S. capability and force structure in Europe, and should part of any calculus when determining whether we have the right amount of forces in Europe.
Finally, in the Age of Austerity that is facing all of the NATO Allies, almost every country is decreasing its military force structure. Given the extreme budget pressures on the United States and its important role as an arsenal of democracy, protecting our economy and controlling fiscal expenditures, like our other Allies are doing, should not come as a surprise. In fact, our NATO Allies should be careful about holding the United
States to a standard too much higher than their own. This will increase resentment in key elements of the U.S. Government, like Congress, where many people already believe that our European Allies are not pulling their own weight in this alliance. It is important to note that only 25% of BCTs being inactivated by the United States will come out of Europe. The rest will be inactivated in the United States. On the other hand, almost all of the forces being cut by our European Allies have come from European based forces. In addition, even after the removal of our forces from Europe, we will continue to maintain a larger forward stationed presence here than anywhere else in the world to include Asia toward where we are making a pivot.
Are we providing the right capabilities?
To determine whether we are providing the right capabilities, it is important to look at the real threats and security challenges facing Europe and then see if the capabilities provided meet these challenges. There are two broad categories of threats that face Europe -traditional and nontraditional threats. 43 Also, the concepts of threats and the ways and means to deal with them are "converging." 44 Forces provide a real and credible deterrent to terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They also provide an enhanced capability to work closer with our NATO Allies in this important military field, which will not only make our allies more effective to counter these real challenges to Europe but will also increase U.S. and
European interoperability in this field.
In addition to these capabilities that will be increasing, the United States is supporting Smart Defense, an effort to pool and share capabilities, and supported the new NATO Concept, which identifies three core tasks -collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. 45 Both of these efforts focus on meeting these new security challenges facing Europe. When coupled with the commitment of a U.S.
BCT to the NRF, this adds real teeth to a U.S. commitment to the security challenges facing Europe. Given the fiscal challenges that the United States is facing, keeping our commitment to these programs and increases these capabilities in future should be taken as a strong commitment to Europe and NATO.
While the author would argue that the U.S. is meeting its commitment to maintain Article V, the final real determination lies not in a qualitative analysis but instead in the subjective perceptions held by European NATO members. This means explaining the drawdown and explaining how the U.S. will still respond to threats facing Europe is extremely important. The U.S. also needs to ensure it maintains commitments that it agrees to.
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However, we should also require this of our partners. Consultations on force modifications in the future should be multilateral and a mechanism should be put in place to make this occur. This will not only help all Allies feel more secure, but it would also help with the concept of "Smart Defense."
Is 'Reversibility' really built into the system? "Reversibility" is an important concept from the Defense Guidance. Additionally, while USAREUR will lose two BCTs and a Corps Headquarters from Europe, it is not losing any other units. The important enablers to support our forces in Europe will remain. This includes infrastructure at sea and airports. After all, the combat support and logistics tail is larger than the actual combat force and maintaining the infrastructure in ports will allow for U.S. forces to rapidly deploy and be resupplied without the necessity to build up this logistical capability prior to a deployment.
Enhanced Capacity and Interoperability for Coalition Operations
The Obama Administration has also stressed its desire to promote capacity and interoperability for coalition operations with our European Allies. The first major impact, while not some tangible or measureable item, is a conceptual and cultural mindshift at deploying worldwide how to be more effective in security assistance and building partner capacity. 47 It is also developing aligned brigades to deploy to various COCOMs in order to assist building partner capacity with the first brigade in training now to deploy to AFRICOM area of operations. 48 The language in the Defense Guidance also attests to the importance placed on the partnerships and building partner capacity. Throughout the document, working with partners and building partner capacity is stressed in each region. Strategist Frank
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Hoffman calls the Defense Guidance the "pivot and partner strategy" and notes that words like partner and allies can be found in it over 53 times. 49 Of course, the DoD"s drawdown in Europe did not create this mindset change nor is it the reason for the change in emphasis on engagement with our allies, but it does show that the language in the Defense Guidance is not just rhetoric but reflects a valued concept for the U.S.
military.
There are also some minor but important steps taken to promote capacity and interoperability in Europe. First, a battalion sized task force is committed to conduct training missions in Europe. While this is a small unit, it is actually a fairly strong commitment that has not been done in the past. Another important point is that the Joint Multinational Training Command, an element that provides training to U.S. and partner units in Europe will not be affected by the drawdown. It is training centers like this and educational and research institutes like the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, and NATO School in which a great deal of interoperability is developed, all of which will stay in Europe.
But there are also troubling signs on the horizon. Interoperability will likely decrease as we drawdown forces in Afghanistan if for no other reason than funding and other resources dedicated to the training partners on the part of both the U.S. and our Allies. 50 Of even greater impact, however, will be the lack of real world coalition operations which create the ultimate crucible for building interoperability.
The age of austerity with its fiscal constraints will undoubtedly impact security assistance funding of which a large portion goes to the purchase of equipment or training to support interoperability. If the 2013 budget request from the Obama Administration is U.S. forces in Europe do matter, but we will be keeping a large and sizeable force in
Europe. This force along with the commitments to the NRF will provide a larger commitment to Europe than before. It will just not all be stationed in Europe. Second, we are leaving the right types of forces in Europe to allow for a rapid return of forces.
Finally, we are providing new capabilities to NATO that in fact responds better to the most likely threats facing Europe than two combat brigades would, namely, augmentation to our Special Forces and BMD. What is the shortcoming to the current drawdown as planned is its ability to support NATO interoperability and capacity building.
The next section of this paper will provide some thoughts on how the United States and its NATO Allies could strengthen this deficit.
Section Four -Toward New Partnerships?
U.S. infrastructure in Europe and elsewhere that supports interoperability, e.g., JMTC, the NATO School, the Marshall Center, Task Force East is an important multiplier for building partner capacity and interoperability in Europe. However, the U.S. should also seek additional funding support from other NATO Allies to support and in some cases widen these programs. This is especially important for JMTC. Each of these centers provide significant benefit to training and bring leaders and soldiers from all of the NATO Allies together either in training events, courses or conferences.
In addition, a number of countries are building JMTC like facilities to support their training, often with the support of USAREUR through JMTC. EUCOM should pick the top tier of those efforts and work with countries in the region to create pooled regional training centers instead of working with all of the countries desiring this capability. The U.S. should focus support from JMTC and additional security assistance funding from the countries in the region to support these programs if the country hosting the facility is willing to commit to a regional center and provide a strong commitment of its own national resources. This would be a great effort to assist in Smart Defense and pooling of defense resources.
EUCOM should look for any and all avenues that would allow cross training of Allied partners" brigadier generals, field grade officers, and mid to senior NCOs. There are three important reasons for this. First, personnel in these ranks will play an important role on future theater and operational coalition staffs. Interacting in significant ways with brigadier generals, (a level of proven potential), and field grade officers will 23 not only provide better leadership in NATO but will also provide a stronger pool of future coalition senior commanders and staff at the two and three star level.
However, most NATO partner countries have no internal ability to develop these officers at this level. Many countries" highest level of field command is at the division level and often these divisions have not deployed on real world missions. This means that the only other places to gain this operational experience at the moment are on NATO staffs or in Afghanistan. However, the ISAF mission will end shortly and NATO billets are limited. Allowing Allied officers to serve on U.S. staff at the division, corps, Army and COCOM level would provide important experience for these officers. It will also provide an excellent opportunity for these officers to learn many of the key skills necessary to help improve their forces interoperability with U.S. forces. Second, this supports efforts of NATO"s "Smart Defense" by pooling some capabilities. Third, it will help to build additional individual relationships between the U.S. and Allied Armed
Forces. With the end of ISAF, opportunities like this will be limited.
If the U.S. does not develop a mechanism to maintain this important integration from its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it will instead be relying on it to occur when it goes to war. While we have proven that this is possible to do in Iraq and Afghanistan, already having a cadre of officers familiar with U.S. operations at division and higher levels will only improve the future effectiveness of coalitions that the U.S. either leads or operates in as a member. While training provides some opportunities to develop these skills, no experience is better than extended assignments working shoulder to shoulder with U.S. forces for long periods of time.
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Of course the reverse is also true, and therefore, we should increase the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) positions to EUCOM and its ASCC staffs and offer some countries the opportunity to provide individual augmentees to key billets on these staffs outside of the PEP system. EUCOM should also offer individual key developmental billets to allied and partner field grade officers in our tactical units stationed in Europe. EUCOM should request that our partners provide units and key staff personnel to augment our regionally aligned brigades to include those assigned outside of EUCOM. These augmentations should start during the training phase and last through the mission phase. States and European headquarters.
In this modern age of austerity, the United States should not be the country required to send its forces across an ocean to train. Our European Allies should commit to exercises in the United States. There are three reasons for this. First, if this is a true alliance and partnership based on an Article V commitment, then this commitment extends to the US and Canada. In fact, the only time that NATO has invoked Article V was just for this type of situation -the terrorist attacks in the United States on 9/11.
Since North America is virtually half of the alliance in geography and strength, there should be exercises and unit training conducted here. Second, Europe expects the U.S.
to provide forces and to use these forces to maintain interoperability; European Allies should provide the same opportunities for United States forces based in the United
States. Finally, such a commitment from our European Allies would serve as an important signal to many in Congress that Europe does take NATO serious and is willing to commit its own resources to maintain interoperability. In an age of declining resources, this would be a strong signal and help to reinforce the other half of the alliance concerning Europe"s own commitment.
A final direction for new cooperation is in the field of security cooperation. 53 The European Allies, who are already capable to provide coalition forces, could certainly export security to third party nations especially where they have close historical or cultural ties, or where their tactics or doctrines would be better suited to providing assistance (e.g., a smaller Allied nations human resources programs or professional military education system may be a better match for many nations than the U.S.
military"s own system). Through a collaborative approach, the U.S. and European Allies could prioritize security cooperation to select third party countries and then coordinate programs that would allow for the Allies to provide assistance individually, with some minor assistance through U.S. provided enablers (e.g., air lift, subject matter experts, or 26 logistical sustainment), or through combined bilateral or even multilateral security cooperation activities.
While this may seem somewhat novel, the truth of the matter is that we have been doing this to a large extent in Afghanistan and Iraq with our allies by training the indigenous forces with multinational training teams. Such a concept could expand to other countries in the Middle East and Africa, where Europe has its own interests that could help to drive such a collaborative endeavor.
Conclusion
While a geopolitical power shift to Asia and a safer Europe has led to a pivot to Asia and drawdown in Europe, this drawdown will maintain our commitment to NATO through a better allocation of the right forces and capabilities. It also presents an important opportunity to develop new and innovative relationships with our closest allies.
Taking advantage of this opportunity will require commitment from both sides. The U.S.
needs to follow through on its commitment to deploy forces, and our NATO allies need to ensure they provide enough resources -primarily defense dollars for acquisition and training -for their forces in order for them to be real partners.
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